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Abstract
Internet services are traditionally priced at flat rates; however, many Internet service providers (ISPs) have recently shifted
towards two-part tariffs where a data cap is imposed to restrain data demand from heavy users. Although the two-part tariff could
generally increase the revenue for ISPs and has been supported by the US FCC, the role of data cap and its optimal pricing
structures are not well understood. In this article, we study the impact of data cap on the optimal two-part pricing schemes for
congestion-prone service markets. We model users’ demand and preferences over pricing and congestion alternatives and derive
the market share and congestion of service providers under a market equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium model, we characterize
the two-part structures of the revenue- and welfare-optimal pricing schemes. Our results reveal that 1) the data cap provides a
mechanism for ISPs to transition from the flat-rate to pay-as-you-go type of schemes, 2) both the revenue and welfare objectives
of the ISP will drive the optimal pricing towards usage-based schemes with diminishing data caps, and 3) the welfare-optimal
tariff comprises lower fees than the revenue-optimal counterpart, suggesting that regulators might want to promote usage-based
pricing but regulate the lump-sum and per-unit fees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, Internet service providers (ISPs) use flat-rate pricing [4] for network services, where users pay fixed monthly
fees for unlimited data usage. Flat-rate pricing was widely adopted because it was easy for ISPs to implement and was preferred
by users for its simplicity. However, with the rapid development and growing popularity of data intensity services, e.g., online
video streaming and cloud-based applications, the Internet traffic keeps growing more than 50% per annum [5], which exposes
some disadvantages of the flat-rate scheme. Because flat-rate does not count the users’ data usage, “bandwidth hogs” [6]
consume an unfair share of capacity and are subsidized by normal users, and ISPs cannot generate enough revenues to recoup
their costs, especially for the mobile providers. As a consequence, most mobile LTE providers [7] and even broadband ISPs,
e.g., Verizon [8] and AT&T [9], start to introduce a data cap1 and adopt a two-part tariff structure, a combination of the flat-rate
and usage-based pricing. Under such a two-part scheme, additional charges are imposed if a user’s data usage exceeds the data
cap and the exceeded amount is charged based on a per-unit fee.
Although prior work [6, 12–14] has shown that data-capped schemes could help providers generate higher revenues than
that under the flat-rate pricing and the FCC chairman has recently backed usage-based pricing for broadband to penalize heavy
Internet users [15], little is known about 1) the data cap’s role and impact on the optimal two-part pricing structure which
maximizes the providers’ revenue or social welfare, and 2) potential regulations on the data cap for protecting social welfare
from the monopoly providers.
In this paper, we address these questions on a generic congestion-prone network service market, e.g., mobile, broadband or
cloud services, and study the data cap under two-part pricing schemes. Unlike physical commodities, the quality of network
services is intricately influenced by a negative network effect (or network externality): the more users access the service
simultaneously, the worse performance it provides. We model this service congestion as a function of providers’ capacity and
their data load. We characterize users by their demand and values on data usage and analyze the market shares of providers
under varying pricing and market structures. We derive the network congestion of providers under a market equilibrium. Based
on the equilibrium model, we analyze the effect of data cap on the provider’s optimal revenue and pricing structure. We
also analyze and compare the revenue-optimal and welfare-optimal two-part schemes, and derive regulatory implications for
protecting social welfare from monopoly providers. Our main contributions and findings include the following.
• We model users’ optimal data usages and preferences over providers for any pricing scheme and congestion level (Section
III). We characterize the existence and uniqueness (Theorem 1) of a congestion equilibrium and show its monotonic
dynamics (Theorem 2) under varying pricing and market structures.
• We analyze the impact of data cap on a provider’s optimal pricing and revenue under two-part tariffs (Section IV). We
find that by decreasing data cap, the revenue-optimal pricing transforms from flat-rate to pay-as-you-go, during which the
provider’s revenue increases from a minimum to a maximum (Theorem 3). With heavier user demand, higher provider’s
The updated version serves an erratum to prior papers [1–3], which studied the role of data cap in optimal two-part tariffs. In Section VI and V of [1]
and [3], and Section III and VI of [2], the theoretical analysis and simulation results of the optimal pricing do not hold in general. In this present article, we
combine the models from the original papers with new corrected results in Section IV and V.
X. Wang and Y. Xu are with School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China. R. T. B. Ma is with School of
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1Wireless ISPs often offer multiple data plans with different caps. Recently, some of them add the so-called unlimited plans [10, 11] that have an infinite
cap. However, these plans usually restrict users’ data usage, e.g., slow down their connection speed, once the usage amount exceeds a certain threshold.
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2capacity, or more intense market competition, the revenue objective will drive providers’ pricing from flat-rate towards
pay-as-you-go more strongly.
• We characterize the welfare-optimal two-part tariff (Section V) and find that the optimal social welfare increases from a
minimum to a maximum when data cap decreases (Theorem 4) and the welfare-optimal pricing imposes lower fees than
those under the revenue-optimal counterpart. These results suggest that regulators might want to encourage the use of
two-part pricing with limited data caps, while regulating the lump-sum and per-unit fees.
We believe that our work provides new insights into the role of data cap in the optimal structure of the two-part tariff.
Our results could help service providers design revenue-optimal pricing schemes and guide regulatory authorities to legislate
desirable regulations.
II. RELATED WORK
Early studies of the two-part tariff came from economics. Oi [16] first studied the price discrimination via quantity discounts
in the monopoly Disneyland market. Calem et al. [17] examined and compared the revenue-optimal prices by a multi-product
monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly. Littlechild [18] studied the explicit characterizations of welfare-optimal pricing and
the effect of consumption externalities. Scotchmer [19] explored the nature of Nash equilibrium among profit-maximizing
shared facilities. However, all of these work were confined to a special case where the data/usage cap is set to be zero. Our
work studies the impact and dynamic of data cap on the two-part pricing, which generalizes the special case.
As the demarcation between the lump-sum and usage-based fees, data cap plays a crucial role in the two-part tariff structures.
Prior work [6, 12–14, 20] demonstrated that data-capped schemes can increase providers’ revenue compared with the traditional
flat-rate pricing [4]. Odlyzko et al. [21] showed that ISPs could also reduce network congestion by imposing data caps. Our
analysis and results also confirm these observations. Furthermore, we focus on understanding the impact of data cap on the
structures of revenue-optimal and welfare-optimal tariffs. The impact and optimal design of data cap have been empirically
studied. In a qualitative study of households users under bandwidth caps, Chetty et al. [22] studied how the uncertainties of
user types and demand would impact the setting of data cap and operator’s revenue, and proposed new tools to help users
manage their caps. Poularakis et al. [23] proposed a framework to calculate the optimal data caps and empirically evaluated
the gains of ISPs when they adopt data caps based on traffic datasets. Unlike these efforts, our work adopts an analytical
approach to characterize the desirable data cap and the optimal two-part pricing structures.
More generally, there have been several works that study the usage-based Internet pricing. Hande et al. [24] characterized
the economic loss due to ISPs’ inability or unwillingness to price broadband access based on the time of use. Li et al. [25]
studied the optimal price differentiation under complete and incomplete information. Basar et al. [26] devised a revenue-
maximizing pricing under varying user scales and network capacities. Shen et al. [27] investigated optimal nonlinear pricing
policy design for a monopolistic service provider and showed that the introduction of nonlinear pricing provides a large profit
improvement over linear pricing. In this paper, besides optimizing the revenue from the provider’s perspective, we look into
the welfare-optimal solution, through which we derive regulatory implications. Chen et al. [28] and Ma [29] also studied the
revenue-optimal and welfare-optimal pricing schemes in network service markets. Chen et al. [28] characterized the equilibrium
allocations of bandwidth when monopoly or competitive wireless ISPs maximize their revenues or social welfare. Ma [29]
observed providers’ optimal pricing strategies in congestion-prone service markets, e.g., cloud or broadband services. Both of
them considered the purest form of usage-based pricing, which does not charge the lump-sum fee and has a zero usage cap,
and thus is a special case of the two-part pricing structure studied in this paper. Besides the usage-based pricing, many other
schemes, e.g., time-dependent pricing [30] and congestion-based pricing [31], have also been adopted for network services.
Gizelis and Vergados conducted a survey [32] which classified and evaluated the wide variety of pricing schemes.
From a modeling perspective, Chander [33], Reitman [34], and our work all consider the service market with congestion
externalities. Chander [33] studied the quality differentiation strategy of a monopoly provider and Reitman [34] studied a
multi-provider price competition. Both of them modeled the market as a continuum of non-atomic users, each of which is
characterized by a quality-sensitivity parameter. However, this one-dimensional model only applies for flat-rate pricing. To
faithfully characterize the utility of users under two-part tiered pricing, we establish a novel two-dimensional model that
describes users by their data demand and valuation on data usage. Duan et al. [35] also built a two-dimensional user model,
based on which they compared the two special cases of two-part pricing structure, whose data caps are zero and infinite,
respectively. Our work studies the general case of two-part pricing structure, whose data cap can be any value. Besides, [35]
modeled the distribution of users’ values as the uniform distribution. To capture the values of different user segments more
truthfully, we derive our results based on more general distributions, including the uniform distribution.
III. MODEL
A. Model of Users and Their Data Demand
We model each user by two orthogonal characteristics: her average value of per-unit data usage v and desirable data demand
u. The user’s data usage is measured by what she is billed, e.g., the number of bits transmitted or the amount of time being
online.
3We denote q as the congestion level of an ISP. Given the network congestion q, we denote ρ(u, q) as the user’s achievable
demand.
Assumption 1. ρ(u, q) : R+×R+ 7→ R+ is a continuous function, increasing in u and decreasing in q. It has an upper-bound
ρ(u, 0) = u and satisfies lim
q→+∞ ρ(u, q) = 0.
Assumption 1 states that a user’s achievable data demand equals its desirable demand u under no congestion and decreases
monotonically when the network congestion q becomes more severe.
Beside network congestion, the user’s actual data usage also depends on her ISP’s pricing. We consider an ISP that adopts
a two-part tiered pricing structure θ = (g, f, p), where g, f and p denote a data cap, a lump-sum service fee, and a per-unit
usage fee, respectively. Under this scheme, we denote t(y, θ) as the user’s charge when y units of data are consumed, defined
as
t(y, θ) , f + p(y − g)+. (1)
Intuitively, if a user’s usage is below the data cap g, the ISP only collects the lump-sum fee f ; otherwise, extra charges are
imposed on the usage above the data cap with the per-unit usage fee of p. This two-part structure is also a generalization of
flat-rate, i.e., g = +∞, and pay-as-you-go [29] pricing, i.e., f = 0 and g = 0.
We denote pi(y, v, θ) as the utility of a user with value v when she consumes y units of data and the ISP’s pricing strategy
is θ, defined by
pi(y, v, θ) , vy − t(y, θ), (2)
i.e., the total traffic value minus the charge. We assume that users determine their optimal data usages that maximize their
utilities. In other words, each user tries to solve the following problem:
Maximize
y
pi(y, v, θ) = vy − t(y, θ)
subject to 0 ≤ y ≤ ρ(u, q),
(3)
where a user’s actual data usage is constrained by the achievable demand ρ(u, q) under the network congestion q. We define
φ = (u, v) as the type of the user and denote y∗(φ, θ, q) as its optimal usage under ISP’s pricing scheme θ and congestion q.
By solving the optimization problem in (3), we derive the unique optimal solution for any user type φ as
y∗(φ, θ, q) = ρ(u, q)− [ρ(u, q)− g]+1{v<p}. (4)
Intuitively, if a user’s achievable demand ρ(u, q) is beyond the data cap g and her value v is lower than the per-unit usage
fee p, she will avoid consuming extra usage above g which would result in reducing her utility, and thus the optimal data
demand equals the data cap, i.e., y∗ = g; otherwise, the optimal data demand equals her achievable demand, i.e., y∗ = ρ(u, q).
Equation 4 also shows that the optimal demand will increase if the value v or desirable demand u or data cap g increases, or
the provider’s per-unit fee p or congestion q decreases.
B. Users’ Preferences over Providers
We consider a market that comprises of a set N of providers. We denote θ = (θi : i ∈ N ) and q = (qi : i ∈ N ) as the
pricing strategy and congestion vectors of the providers. We define y∗i (φ) , y∗(φ, θi, qi) as the optimal demand of user type
φ when it chooses provider i. For any two providers i, j ∈ N , we denote i φ j if users of type φ prefer i over j.
Definition 1. We denote pii(y, v, θ) as the user’s utility function when using provider i. For any i, j ∈ N , i φ j if and only
if 1) pii
(
y∗i (φ), v, θi
)
> pij
(
y∗j (φ), v, θj
)
or 2) pii
(
y∗i (φ), v, θi
)
= pij
(
y∗j (φ), v, θj
)
and i is chosen over j by the user based on
any arbitrary tie-breaking condition.
Based on Definition 1, we assume that users of type φ would choose their favorite provider i that induces the highest utility
under their optimal data usage, i.e., i φ j,∀j ∈ N\{i}. However, a user’s best provider might still induce negative utility,
and therefore we allow users not to use any of the providers if they all induce negative utility as follows.
Assumption 2. There exists a provider, indexed by 0, that sets f0 = p0 = 0 and maintains a fixed level of congestion q0.
Assumption 2 states that there always exist a free provider that users can choose. When we set the congestion level q0 = +∞,
the free provider becomes a dummy provider which users could choose so as to guarantee zero utility. Furthermore, when the
congestion q0 < +∞, the free provider can be used to characterize lower-end competitors in the market that have capacities
to accommodate users with a certain congestion quality q0. Because in practice, users might also find public options [36] such
as free municipal WiFi and municipal broadband [37] recently supported by the US FCC. To distinguish between the free
provider and normal providers, we assume that the set N are all normal providers, i.e., 0 /∈ N .
Based on Definition 1 and Assumption 2, we denote Φi as provider i’s market share, i.e., the set of user types that choose
to use i, defined by
Φi(θ,q, q0) =
{
φ : i φ j,∀j ∈ N ∪ {0}\{i}
}
. (5)
4Next, we show how providers’ market shares Φi(θ,q, q0) vary when the set of competing providers N or the pricing decisions
θ change.
Proposition 1. For a set N of providers, if two pricing decisions θˆ and θ satisfy gˆi ≥ gi, fˆi ≤ fi, pˆi ≤ pi for some i ∈ N
and θˆj = θj for all j 6= i, we have Φi(θ,q, q0) ⊆ Φi(θˆ,q, q0) and Φj(θ,q, q0) ⊇ Φj(θˆ,q, q0), ∀ j 6= i. For two sets N and
N ′ of providers, if N ⊆ N ′ and (θ′i, q′i)= (θi, qi) for ∀i ∈ N , we have Φi(θ′,q′, q0) ⊆ Φi(θ,q, q0), ∀ i ∈ N .
Proposition 1 states that under fixed levels of congestion q, the market share of a provider would increase if the provider
reduces its fees f or p, or raises its data cap g, unilaterally. Meanwhile, the market share of any other provider will decrease.
It implies that monopolistic providers could use fees and data cap to trade off its market share and revenue; while oligopolistic
providers could compete for market shares by decreasing their fees and increasing data caps. Proposition 1 also implies that
bringing new providers into the market will intensify market competition and existing providers’ market shares will decrease
because some of their users might switch to the new providers.
Proposition 1 holds under the condition of fixed network congestion. However, a provider’s congestion level depends on
its market share and the data usage of its users. We discuss the dynamics of network congestion and equilibrium in the next
subsection.
C. Network Congestion and Equilibrium
We denote U and V as the maximum desirable data demand and maximum per-unit data value of all users. Thus, the domain
of users can be defined by Φ , [0, U ]× [0, V ]. We model the distribution of users by the measure space (Φ, µ), where µ is a
product measure
µ(E1 × E2) = µu(E1)× µv(E2), ∀ E1 ⊆ [0, U ], E2 ⊆ [0, V ],
where µu and µv are two continuous measures, defined by
µu
(
(u1, u2]
)
= Fu(u2)− Fu(u1),∀u1 ≤ u2, and
µv
(
(v1, v2]
)
= Fv(v2)− Fv(v1),∀v1 ≤ v2,
for non-decreasing distribution functions Fu(u) and Fv(v). The distribution functions Fu(u) and Fv(v) capture the population
of users whose desirable demand and value are less than or equal to u and v, respectively. Thus, µ(E1 × E2) measures the
population of users whose types belong to the set E1 × E2.
Based on the distribution of users, we define the provider i’s data load, i.e., the aggregate data demand of users of i, by
di = D(Φi(θ,q, q0); θi, qi) ,
∫
Φi(θ,q,q0)
y∗i (φ, θi, qi)dµ (6)
On the one hand, given congestion levels q, provider i has an induced data load di = D(Φi; θi, qi). On the other hand, the
provider’s congestion level qi is influenced by its data load di. We denote ci as provider i’s capacity and model its congestion
as a function qi = Qi(di, ci) of data load di and capacity ci.
Assumption 3. Qi(di, ci) : R2+ 7→ R+ is continuous, increasing in di, decreasing in ci and satisfies Qi(0, ci) = 0.
Different forms of the congestion function Qi can be used to model the different technologies used by the provider.
Assumption 3 implies that a provider i’s congestion increases (decreases) when its data load di (capacity ci) increases, and no
congestion exists when no user consumes data from the provider.
We denote Q−1i (qi, ci) as the inverse function of Qi(di, ci) with respect to di, which defines the implied load under the
capacity ci and an observed congestion level of qi. By Assumption 3, we know that Q−1i (qi, ci) is continuous, increasing in
both qi and ci, and satisfies Q−1i (0, ci) = 0. We denote c = (ci : i ∈ N ) as the vector of the capacities of all the providers.
Under an exogenous level q0 of congestion and when the providers make exogenous pricing decisions θ and capacity planning
decisions c, the resulting congestion q of the providers can be determined endogenously when users choose their best providers.
We define such a market equilibrium of the system as follows.
Definition 2. Given the congestion level q0, for a set N of providers with any fixed pricing strategies θ and capacities c, q
is an equilibrium if and only if
qi = Qi
(
D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0); θi, qi
)
, ci
)
, ∀i ∈ N .
To better understand the above definition, we can equivalently rephrase the above equality condition as D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0); θi, qi
)
=
Q−1i (qi, ci), where the left-hand side is the induced data load of provider i given its market share Φi(θ,q, q0), pricing strategy
θi and congestion qi and the right-hand side is its implied data load under capacity ci. In equilibrium, both equal the actual
aggregate user demand di. Because the equilibrium depends on the pricing strategies θ, capacities c and congestion q0, we
also denote it as q(θ, c, q0).
5(a) equilibrium market share (b) cI decreases to 0.3 (c) q0 increases to 3.0
(d) fI reduces to 0.05 (e) pI reduces to 0.1 (f) gI relaxes to 0.6
Fig. 1. Shift of market share for the provider
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1-3, for any fixed pricing strategies θ, capacities c and congestion q0, there exists at least
one market equilibrium, and the equilibrium(s) must have the following properties:
1) for the market including only two normal providers, i.e., N = {i, j}, if there exist multiple equilibria, then (qi− qˆi)(qj−
qˆj) ≥ 0 for any two equilibria q and qˆ.
2) for the market including only one normal provider, i.e., |N | = 1, the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 1 states that under minor assumptions of the demand (Assumption 1) and congestion (Assumption 3), the existence
of market equilibrium can be guaranteed. The first property shows that when the market has only two normal providers, the
providers’ congestion levels have the same changing direction (i.e., both increase or both decrease) as the market shifts from
an equilibrium to another equilibrium. The second property tells that when the market has only one normal provider, it has a
unique equilibrium. For this case, we denote I as the provider and define I = {I}. The next theorem shows how its congestion
level varies when its pricing strategy θI and capacity cI change, or other providers enter the market.
Theorem 2. In a market I, provider I’s unique level of congestion qI(θI , cI , q0) in equilibrium is non-increasing in its fees
fI , pI and capacity cI , but is non-decreasing in its data cap gI and congestion q0 of the free provider. When new providers
enter and form a new market N ⊃ I and I keeps its pricing θI and capacity cI , I’s congestion qI(θ, c, q0) under any new
equilibrium satisfies qI(θ, c, q0) ≤ qI(θI , cI , q0).
Theorem 2 states that when the normal provider increases fees or decreases data cap, its induced congestion level will be
alleviated because its market share and data load will decrease. When the provider increases capacity, the congestion level will
also decrease, although the resulting market share and data load will increase. Furthermore, if the congestion q0 deteriorates, the
provider’s congestion will increase, as some users of the free provider will shift to it. It also shows that with more competing
providers, the existing monopoly’s congestion will decrease, as users have more choices and may switch to other providers.
This implies that competition could alleviate the congestion of the providers because effectively more providers bring higher
capacity to the entire market.
Under any market equilibrium q(θ, c, q0), we denote Ri and Si as the revenue and social welfare generated by provider i,
defined as
Ri ,
∫
Φi
t (y∗i (φ), θi) dµ and Si ,
∫
Φi
vy∗i (φ)dµ, (7)
where y∗i (φ) = y
∗(φ, θi, qi) and Φi = Φi(θ,q, q0) are evaluated at the equilibrium q(θ, c, q0).
6D. Model Parameters and Properties
Although our model is built upon generic assumptions (Assumption 1 and 3), it does not yet capture the characteristics of
network services. To this end, we carefully choose the model parameters, i.e., the congestion function Qi(di, ci), the achievable
demand function ρ(u, q) and the measure space (Φ, µ) of user domain.
Next, we choose a quintessential form ρ(u, q) = ue−q for the achievable demand function, which is used by prior work
[34, 38]. Under this form, the user’s achievable demand decays exponentially at a rate of q, i.e., the level of congestion. We
adopt the congestion function Qi(di, ci) = di/ci, which models the capacity sharing [39] nature of network services. This
form has been used in much prior work such as [39–41].
Corollary 1. Suppose ρ(u, q) = ue−q , Qi(di, ci) = di/ci for all i ∈ N and let q be an equilibrium under parameters
q0,θ, c,Φ and µ. For another market with qˆ0 = q0, fˆ = f/(UV ), gˆ = g/U , pˆ = p/V , cˆ = c/
(
Uµ(Φ)
)
, Φˆ = [0, 1] × [0, 1]
and µˆ([0, uˆ]× [0, vˆ]) = µ([0, u]× [0, v])/µ(Φ) where (uˆ, vˆ) = (u/U, v/V ) ∈ Φˆ, we must have qˆ = q as an equilibrium under
which dˆi = di/
(
Uµ(Φ)
)
for all i ∈ N .
Corollary 1 states that under the exponential form of achievable demand and capacity sharing nature of network services,
the domain and measure of users can be normalized to be [0, 1] × [0, 1] and probability measure, respectively. In particular,
keeping the congestion level of the free provider unchanged, the equilibrium does not change when 1) the lump-sum fees f are
normalized by UV , 2) the data caps g and the users’ desirable demands u are normalized by U , 3) the per-unit fees p and the
users’ values v are normalized by V , 4) the capacities c are normalized by Uµ(Φ), and 5) the user population µ([0, u]× [0, v])
is normalized by µ(Φ).
Based on this result, we can focus on the maximum user demand and value U = V = 1 (i.e., Φ = [0, 1] × [0, 1]) and
probability distribution functions Fu(U) = Fv(V ) = 1 (i.e., µu([0, U ]) = µv([0, V ]) = µ(Φ) = 1) without loss of generality.
Furthermore, we assume the values of users satisfies the polynomial distribution Fv(x) = xβ with a parameter β > 0, and in
the later sections, we simulate the distribution of user demand by Fv(x) = xα with a parameter α > 0. In particular, when
α = 1, user demand are uniformly distributed; otherwise, they are leaning toward the high (α > 1) or low (α < 1) values in
the domain [0, 1]. In summary, we will analyze the two-part tiered pricing of the providers with the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Any provider i’s congestion level satisfies Qi(di, ci) = di/ci, users’ achievable demands satisfy ρ(u, q) = ue−q ,
and their values are distributed by Fv(x) = xβ for x ∈ [0, 1].
When the level of the congestion is exogenously given, Proposition 1 implies that the market share of a provider will decrease
when it raises fees, e.g., fI and pI , or reduces data cap gI . However, the higher fees or lower data cap would alleviate the
provider’s congestion in equilibrium by Theorem 2, which results in attracting more congestion-sensitive users to join. As a
result, the dynamics of the provider’s market share combines both effects and may not be monotonic as we illustrate through
an example in Figure 1 under Assumption 4. In this example, the users are uniformly distributed, i.e., α = β = 1. In each
subfigure, x-axis and y-axis vary the desirable data demand u and value v of the user types. In other words, each point in
the subfigures represents a unique user type. We use different colors of points to represent the data usages y∗ of user types.
In subfigure (a), the upper-right area shows the market share ΦI of the normal provider when it makes the pricing strategy
θI = (gI , fI , pI) = (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) and capacity cI = 0.5, under the congestion q0 = 1.5. These parameters induce congestion
qI = 0.3387 and data load dI = 0.1693 in equilibrium. From subfigure (a) to (b), the provider’s capacity cI is reduced from
0.5 to 0.3, which exacerbates the congestion level and results in a smaller market share for the provider. From subfigure (a)
to (c), the market is less competitive, i.e., q0 increases from 1.5 to 3.0; from subfigure (a) to (d), the provider uses a lower
lump-sum fee, i.e., f decreases from 0.1 to 0.05. Both cases lead to a larger market share ΦI as well as higher congestion
qI and data load d of the provider. From subfigure (a) to (e) and (f), the provider decreases the per-unit fee to pI = 0.1 and
increases the data cap to gI = 0.6, respectively. The lower per-unit fee and higher data cap also induce higher data load dI
and congestion qI for the provider; however, the resulting market share ΦI attracts more low-value heavy users and loses some
high-value light users. In all cases, the congestion of the provider in equilibrium is always smaller than the congestion q0 of
market competitors, which is consistent with the result of Theorem 1.
IV. REVENUE-OPTIMAL PRICING
We studied the market shares, congestion levels and data loads of providers under a market equilibrium in the previous
section. In this section, we explore how providers set the two-part pricing strategy so as to optimize their revenues. Because
the data cap is the demarcation between the lump-sum (for demand below the data cap) and usage-based (for demand above
the data cap) charges, we first study the impact of data cap on the provider’s optimal revenue and pricing decisions and then
identify the role of data cap in the two-part pricing structure, finally we characterize the dynamics of the two-part pricing
under varying system parameters, i.e., the distribution of users’ demand, the capacities of the providers, the level of the market
competition.
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Fig. 2. Maximum revenue, optimal lump-sum and per-unit fee under varying data caps.
A. The Impact of Data Cap
We focus on a single normal provider in the market and use the free provider with congestion q0 to model its lower-end
competitors. Under any given data cap gI , we assume the ISP chooses the lump-sum and per-unit fees, i.e., fI and pI , to
maximize its revenue RI , which is formulated by the following optimization problem.
Maximize RI(gI , fI , pI), (8)
subject to fI , pI ≥ 0.
We denote f∗I (gI) and p
∗
I(gI) as an optimal solution of (8), and R
∗
I(gI) as the corresponding maximum revenue. Next, we
study how various data caps influence its optimal revenue R∗I , and corresponding pricing decisions, i.e., f
∗
I and p
∗
I . In particular,
we compare the two-part pricing with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e., fI = gI = 0, and the flat-rate scheme, i.e., gI = +∞.
For simplification, we define the maximum revenue under the flat-rate as R∗∞ , lim
gI→∞
R∗I(gI).
We consider the models under Assumption 4 where the maximum desirable demand is normalized to U = 1. As a result,
an effective data cap gI that might influence the users’ demand has to be less than or equal to 1. In other words, when gI
is larger than 1, the two-part pricing is equivalent to a flat-rate scheme, i.e., R∗I(gI) = R
∗
∞ = R
∗
I(1) for any gI > 1. Thus,
we will focus on gI ∈ [0, 1] without loss of generality. Figure 2 shows how the data cap gI influences the ISP’s maximum
revenue R∗I(gI), an the optimal fees f
∗
I (gI), p
∗
I(gI), under the uniform user distribution, i.e., α = β = 1, and normalized ISP
capacity and free provider’s congestion, i.e., cI = q0 = 1. Subfigures (a) to (c) plots R∗I , f
∗
I and p
∗
I as functions of the data
cap gI varying along the x-axis, respectively.
From Figure 2(a), we observe that the optimal revenue R∗I decreases monotonically with the data cap gI . Specifically, 1)
when the pricing converges to the flat-rate structure as gI goes to one, the optimal revenue reaches a minimum; and 2) when the
pricing converges to the (pure) usage-based structure as gI tends to zero, the optimal revenue gets a maximum. From Figures
2(b) and 2(c), we see that the optimal fees f∗I , p
∗
I both show increasing trends as the data cap gI is relaxed. In particular, as
the data cap is zero, the lump-sum fee is also zero, implying that the optimal two-part pricing is a pay-as-you-go scheme. The
following theorem shows that our observations on the optimal revenue and fees are not particular to the model parameters,
i.e., α = β = cI = q0 = 1.
Theorem 3. For any congestion q0, parameters β, cI > 0 under Assumption 4, the provider’s optimal revenue satisfies
R∗∞ ≤ R∗I(gI) ≤ R∗I(0), ∀ gI ≥ 0.
Furthermore, when the data cap is zero, the revenue-optimal lump-sum fee is zero, i.e., f∗I (0) = 0.
Theorem 3 shows that the revenue generated under an optimal two-part pricing with any fixed data cap gI (≥ 0) is no less than
that under an optimal flat-rate scheme. In other words, an ISP could always be better off by switching from an optimal flat-rate
scheme to an optimal two-part pricing scheme. Intuitively, under any fixed lump-sum fI , the two-part structure generalizes the
flat-rate scheme under which pI = 0 and the data cap does not play a role. Consequently, even without changing its flat-rate
fI , the ISP could restrict gI and increase pI to trade off between higher usage revenue from high-value users’ demand and
its market share, which potentially lead to higher total revenue. This result is consistent with the views in prior work [12–14]
that data cap could help providers extract higher revenue from the market.
Theorem 3 also states that when the data cap is zero, the revenue from the optimal two-part pricing reaches a maximum
value and the corresponding lump-sum fee is zero. In other words, the optimal two-part scheme with zero data cap has a
pay-as-you-go structure, which is also a global optimal two-part pricing with any data cap. Since the two-part structure is
8a generalization of the pay-as-you-go scheme, this result may not seem intuitive. We will provide a critical and detailed
explanation of this result in the next subsection.
In summary, the data cap plays a transitional role between the flat-rate and pay-as-you-go pricing. Specifically, with the
diminishing data cap, an ISP’s optimal pricing transitions from a more flat-rate structure to a more pay-as-you-go structure,
and the corresponding revenue changes from a minimum to a maximum. This impact on the transformation of the optimal
pricing structure holds regardless of the competition level and the ISP’s capacity.
B. Global Optimal Two-part Pricing Structure
In the previous subsection, we showed that the data cap is a transitional mechanism between the flat-rate and the pay-as-
you-go pricing, and the latter is a global revenue-optimal structure under the two-part pricing. In this subsection, we provide
a detailed explanation of why the pay-as-you-go pricing is a global optimal two-part pricing structure, from which we reveal
that the data cap offers a way of transformation between coarse- and fine-grained pricing modes.
As shown in Equation (4), a user’s optimal data usage y∗ on the ISP largely depends on her desirable demand u. We
first consider the ISP’s pricing strategy on the set of the users of the same desirable demand. Under any two-part pricing
θI = (gI , fI , pI) and congestion level qI , we denote VI(θI , qI , u) as the set of the values of the users who have desirable
demand u and choose to use the ISP. We denote RI(θI , qI , u) and dI(θI , qI , u) as the revenue and data load generated by
these users, respectively, defined by
RI(θI , qI , u) , F ′u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
t
(
y∗I (u, v), θI
)
dFv (9)
dI(θI , qI , u) , F ′u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
y∗I (u, v)dFv (10)
where y∗I (u, v) = y
∗((u, v), θI , qI) and t(y∗I (u, v), θI) are user’s optimal data usage and charge, respectively. To distinguish
the pay-as-you-go pricing from the two-part pricing, we denote it as θ˜I , (0, 0, p˜I).
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 4 and any fixed congestion levels qI , q0 and user demand u, for any two-part pricing θI ,
there always exists a pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜I satisfying that RI(θ˜I , qI , u)=RI(θI , qI , u) and dI(θ˜I , qI , u)≤dI(θI , qI , u).
Proposition 2 states that under a fixed congestion level, for any two-part pricing scheme, an ISP could always find a pay-
as-you-go scheme which generates the same revenue but lower data load from the set of users of the same demand. It implies
that the pay-as-you-go pricing is the most efficient two-part pricing structure for the set of users of the same demand.
To further analyze the pricing schemes in the market including users of various demands, we define a demand-based two-part
pricing, denoted as θI(u) , (gI(u), fI(u), pI(u)) (u ∈ [0, 1]), where gI(u), fI(u) and pI(u) are continuous functions of the
desirable demand u. Under this pricing strategy, a user with desirable demand u0(∈ [0, 1]) is charged based on the data cap
gI(u0), the lump-sum fee fI(u0) and the per-unit fee pI(u0). This demand-based pricing structure is a generalization of the
two-part pricing θI = (gI , fI , pI), i.e., gI(u) = gI , fI(u) = fI , pI(u) = pI for any u ∈ [0, 1]. To distinguish the two types
of pricing modes, we call θI as a fixed two-part pricing. Similarly, we refer to θ˜I(u) , (0, 0, p˜I(u)) and θ˜I = (0, 0, p˜I) as
demand-based and fixed pay-as-you-go pricing, respectively, where the former is a generalization of the latter.
Based on Definition 2, we extend the definition of the congestion equilibrium from the fixed two-part pricing to the demand-
based two-part pricing, as follows.
Definition 3. Given the congestion level q0 of free provider, for the ISP I with any fixed demand-based two-part pricing θI(u)
and capacity cI , qI is an equilibrium if and only if qI = QI
(
D
(
ΦI(θI(u), qI , q0); θI(u), qI
)
, cI
)
where ΦI is the set of users
who choose the ISP and the function D is the aggregate data usage (load) of the users.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1-3, for any given demand-based pricing strategy θI(u), capacity cI and congestion q0, there
always exists a unique equilibrium qI , satisfying qI < q0.
Lemma 1 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the congestion equilibrium under any demand-based pricing strategy.
We denote the equilibrium under the pricing strategy θI(u) as qI(θI(u)). Furthermore, we denote the provider’s revenue and
data load from all users of various demands in equilibrium as RI
(
θI(u), qI(θI(u))
)
and dI
(
θI(u), qI(θI(u))
)
, respectively,
defined by
RI
(
θI(u), qI(θI(u))
)
=
∫ 1
0
RI
(
θI(u0), qI(θI(u)), u0
)
du0,
dI
(
θI(u), qI(θI(u))
)
=
∫ 1
0
dI
(
θI(u0), qI(θI(u)), u0
)
du0 (11)
where RI
(
θI(u0), qI(θI(u)),u0
)
and dI
(
θI(u0), qI(θI(u)),u0
)
are the revenue and the data load generated from the users of
the desirable demand u0.
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pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜I(u) satisfying that RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI(θ˜I(u))
) ≥ RI(θI(u), qI(θI(u))).
Proposition 3 tells that under equilibrium, for any demand-based two-part pricing scheme, there must exist a demand based
pay-as-you-go pricing which could generate a higher or the same revenue from all users of various demands. The reason
is that from Proposition 2, for the given demand-based two-part pricing θI(u), we could always find a demand-based pay-
as-you-go pricing θ˜I(u) which generates the same revenue but no larger data load from users of various demands, under
the same congestion level qI(θI(u)). Because the congestion level increases with the data load based on Assumption 3, the
congestion equilibrium qI(θ˜I(u)) must be no larger than the congestion qI(θI(u)). Furthermore, because the provider’s revenue
is non-increasing in its congestion level, the ISP’s revenue under the pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜I(u) is no less than that under
the two-part pricing θI(u) in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 implies that the demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing is an optimal demand-based two-part pricing structure.
However, it is not enough to declare that the fixed pay-as-you-go and fixed two-part pricing also satisfy this relation. To achieve
this, we provide the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 4, θ˜I ,
(
0, 0, p˜I
)
is a revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing, if and only if θ˜I(u) ,(
0, 0, p˜I(u)
)
where p˜I(u) = p˜I for all u ∈ [0, 1] is a revenue-optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing.
Proposition 4 shows that an optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing scheme is also an optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go
pricing scheme. Intuitively, the pay-as-you-go structure is a pure usage-based pricing mode, i.e., the charge for a user is
proportional to her usage. Thus, the revenue-optimal price only depends on the distribution of user value. Because we assume
that the user’s value and demand are independent, under the demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing structure, the revenue-optimal
prices for the user sets of different desirable demands are all the same, which is also a revenue-optimal price under the fixed
pay-as-you-go pricing structure.
So far, we can provide a full explanation of why the fixed pay-as-you-go pricing is a revenue-optimal fixed two-part pricing
structure. Based on Proposition 4, an optimal fixed pay-as-you-go scheme is also an optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go
scheme, which generates no lower revenue compared with any demand-based two-part scheme from Proposition 3. Because
the fixed two-part pricing is a specialization of the demand-based pricing, the optimal fixed pay-as-you-go scheme obtains no
lower revenue than any fixed two-part scheme, i.e., the pay-as-you-go pricing is a revenue-optimal two-part pricing structure.
From Proposition 3 and 4, we can also see the advantage of the pay-as-you-go pricing relative to the two-part pricing, i.e.,
the pay-as-you-go structure is a more fine-grained pricing mode compared to the two-part structure with a positive data cap.
Specifically, the pay-as-you-go pricing is completely usage-based and fine-grained, which can achieve the revenue optimization
in the market including users of various demands. By contract, the coarse-grained flat-rate has different optimal fees for users
of different demands and thus it can not optimize the provider’s revenue from users of various demands, which also occurs in
the two-part pricing with any positive data cap, the combination of the flat-rate and the pay-as-you-go pricing.
In summary, decreasing the data cap transforms the optimal two-part pricing from a more flat-rate structure to a more
pay-as-you-go structure. This shift from a more coarse-grained pricing scheme to a more fine-grained pricing scheme help the
providers extracting higher revenue in the market including users of various demands.
C. Dynamics of Two-part Pricing
In the previous two subsections, we showed that the ISP’s optimal revenue increases from a minimum to a maximum when
data cap decreases. In this subsection, we further explore the change of the increase rate of the revenue under varying system
parameters, e.g., the distribution of the user demand α, the capacity of the ISP cI , and the level of the market competition q0.
As shown in Figure 2, the provider’s revenue increases as the data cap decreases. Furthermore, we denote k∗I (gI) as the
increase rate of the optimal revenue under the two-part pricing with data cap gI compared to the optimal revenue under the
flat-rate, defined by k∗I (gI) = [R
∗
I(gI)−R∗∞] /R∗∞. The increase rate k∗I (gI) reflects the growth level of the optimal revenue
when the pricing changes from the flat-rate to the two-part scheme with the data cap gI .
Figure 3 to 5 plot the ISP’s optimal revenue R∗I (left) and the increase rate k
∗
I (right) as a function of its data cap gI varying
along the x-axis. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the impact of the parameter α of the distribution of users’ demands, the capacity cI
of the ISP, and the congestion q0 of the free provider, respectively.
Figure 3 shows that small value of α induces low optimal revenue R∗I but high increase rate k
∗
I . Intuitively, when α is small,
few users are heavy-demand and most users are light-demand. Under this case, the provider can only extract a low revenue.
Because the utilities of the mostly light-demand users are small, the provider has to set a cheap lump-sum fee under the
flat-rate for maximizing the revenue. However, the flat-rate structure does not restrict the users’ usage, the cheap lump-sum fee
can not effectively charge to the few heavy-demand users. By contrast, when adopting the two-part pricing, the provider could
optimize its revenue from the heavy-demand users by charging the per-unit fee for the usage above the data cap. Therefore,
the increase rate of the revenue under data capped schemes is high as α is small.
From Figure 4, we observe that large value of cI leads to high optimal revenue R∗I and increase rate k
∗
I . Because when the
provider’s capacity cI increases, it reduces the network congestion and increases the achievable demand of the users. Then the
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provider could obtain higher usage revenue from the added heavy-demand users by taking the usage-based two-part pricing,
which potentially results in a faster increase rate of the total revenue.
Figure 5 shows that small value of q0 induces low optimal revenue R∗I but high increase rate k
∗
I . Because when the congestion
q0 of the free provider reduces, i.e., the market competition is fiercer, some low-value and light-demand users of the ISP would
shift to the free provider and the ISP’s optimal revenue would decrease. However, the proportion of the heavy-demand and
high-value users of the ISP increase as the market competition from the free provider (lower-end competitors) becomes more
intense. In this situation, the ISP can obtain higher revenue growth by adopting the usage-based two-part pricing from the
heavy high-value users, and therefore the increase rate of the revenue is faster.
The above observations from Figure 3 to 5 also provide an explanation of why Internet service providers have shifted their
pricing from the traditional flat-rate to the two-part structure recently. In the early years of the Internet, data demands were
mostly for texts and used by small groups of advanced users with high-value tasks, e.g., scientific and business purposes. The
network capacities were scarce before the emergence of fiber optics backbones. Under such conditions, flat-rate pricing could
be used to effectively recoup costs and the maximum revenue under two-part pricing would not be much higher than that
under an optimal flat-rate scheme. As mobile devices become a key means to access the Internet for end-users and multimedia
content become more pervasive, together with the increase in network capacities, a number of “bandwidth hogs” [6] (i.e.,
heavy-demand users) emerge. As a result, providers now feel that flat-rate schemes cannot effectively influence users’ demand
and optimize their revenues; and therefore, start to adopt two-part pricing schemes. Furthermore, implied by the observations,
if the providers continue to extend their capacity and the competition from the free municipal WiFi and municipal broadband
[37] becomes fiercer, we would expect that providers will further reduce the lump-sum component and data cap to move closer
to the pay-as-you-go pricing in the near future. In practice, the introduction of data cap in the two-part pricing also provides
a means for providers to transition from the flat-rate to pay-as-you-go smoothly so that the changes will not be too abrupt for
users and providers will not lose users due to the structural change of pricing schemes.
In summary, the structure of the optimal two-part pricing is largely influenced by the data cap, which plays a transitional
role (mechanism) between the flat-rate and the pay-as-you-go type of pricing schemes. Specifically, diminishing the data cap
transforms the optimal pricing from a more coarse-grained flat-rate structure to a more fine-grained pay-as-you-go structure
which leads to higher revenue of providers. As heavy users emerge, providers’ capacities grow or the competition from lower-
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end competitors becomes intense, revenue objectives will drive providers more strongly to shift from the flat-rate towards
pay-as-you-go schemes.
V. WELFARE-OPTIMAL PRICING
In the previous section, we studied the revenue-optimal pricing under which we showed the transitional role of data cap.
However, the revenue-optimal solution does not maximize the social welfare, i.e., the total utility of the providers and their
users. Although market competition in general improves the social welfare, which will be maximized in a perfectly competitive
market under certain conditions [42], [43, Chapter 10.1.3], a large deviation from the maximum welfare would more likely
happen in a monopoly market. In the section, we focus on a monopoly market, i.e., the congestion level of the free provider
is q0 = +∞. We characterize the impact of data cap under the welfare-optimal pricing structure. We also compare the
welfare-optimal and revenue-optimal solutions of the monopoly provider and derive regulatory implications.
Under any given data cap gI , we denote f◦I (gI) and p
◦
I(gI) as the optimal lump-sum fee and per-unit fee that maximize the
social welfare SI (defined in Equation 7) and result in the optimal welfare S◦I (gI). To make a comparison, we denote S
∗
I (gI)
as the social welfare achieved under the provider’s revenue-optimal fees f∗I (gI) and p
∗
I(gI). Next, we study how various data
caps influence its optimal welfare S◦I , and corresponding pricing decisions, i.e., f
◦
I and p
◦
I . In particular, we compare the
two-part pricing with the pay-as-you-go scheme, i.e., fI = gI = 0, and the flat-rate scheme, i.e., gI = +∞. For simplification,
we define the optimal social welfare under the flat-rate as S◦∞ = lim
gI→∞
S◦I (gI).
Figure 6 shows how data cap gI influences the optimal social welfare S◦I (gI), and the welfare-optimal fees f
◦
I , p
◦
I , under
the uniform user distribution, i.e., α = β = 1, and an ISP capacity cI = 0.3. Subfigures (a) to (c) plot S◦I , f
◦
I and p
◦
I as
functions of the data cap gI varying along the x-axis, respectively. As a comparison, we also plot the social welfare S∗I and
the corresponding revenue-optimal fees f∗I , p
∗
I in the three subfigures, respectively. We observe that the optimal welfare S
◦
I
increases monotonically with the decrease of the data cap, which has the same changing trend as the optimal revenue R∗I shown
in Figure 2. In other words, when the pricing moves from a more flat-rate structure to a more usage-based structure with the
diminishing data cap, the optimal welfare changes from a minimum to a maximum. Further, as the data cap gI is zero, the
lump-sum fee f◦I is also zero, implying the welfare-optimal pricing becomes a pay-as-you-go scheme. The following theorem
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shows that these observations on the optimal welfare and fees are not particular to the model parameters, i.e., α = β = 1 and
cI = 0.3.
Theorem 4. For any parameters β, cI > 0 under Assumption 4, the optimal social welfare satisfies
S◦∞ ≤ S◦I (gI) ≤ S◦I (0), ∀ gI ≥ 0.
Furthermore, when the data cap is zero, the welfare-optimal lump-sum fee is zero, i.e., f◦I (0) = 0.
Theorem 4 states that the social welfare generated from any optimal two-part pricing under a fixed data cap gI ≥ 0 is no less
than that under an optimal flat-rate scheme and no more than that under an optimal pay-as-you-go scheme. The explanation is
similar to that of the result of the optimal revenue in Theorem 3, i.e., the pay-as-you-go structure is a pure usage-based pricing
mode which is more fine-grained than the flat-rate structure. It can utilize the provider’s capacity more effectively and generate
higher welfare from the market including users of various demands. Thus, with the diminishing data cap, the welfare-optimal
pricing transforms from a more flat-rate structure to a more pay-as-you-go structure, and the corresponding welfare varies from
a minimum to a maximum. The results of Theorem 3 and 4 imply that both of the revenue and welfare objectives motivate
the data cap decrease and move the two-part pricing towards usage-based schemes. This implication provides justifications for
regulators, e.g., the U.S. FCC, to encourage the shift to a more usage-based pricing with limited data cap for the ISPs.
From Figure 6, we also observe that the curves of the welfare-optimal fees f◦I and p
◦
I are always lower than those of the
revenue-optimal fees f∗I and p
∗
I , respectively. Because exorbitant fees reduce users’ utilities and data demand, resulting in
lower social welfare. This implies that regulators might need to regulate the lump-sum and per-unit fees to guarantee higher
social welfare.
In summary, our results suggest that in monopoly markets, regulators might encourage the ISPs to shift towards the two-part
pricing with limited data caps; however, they need to regulate the lump-sum and per-unit fees for protecting the social welfare.
Notice that this suggestion is complementary to the usual policy of encouraging market competition. Although competition
improves the social welfare in general, there now exist many monopolistic markets where it is difficult to bring in multiple
ISPs to form effective competition in a short term. For example, in many broadband markets of rural areas, ISPs have fewer
incentives to deploy capacities due to low user densities and natural monopolies emerge as a result of high deployment costs.
In these markets, the regulations on the data caps and prices of monopoly ISPs are strongly needed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the role of data cap in the optimal structure of two-part tariffs. We present a novel model of users’
demand and preferences over pricing and congestion alternatives and derive the market share and congestion of the service
providers under a market equilibrium. Based on the model, we characterize the two-part structure of the revenue-optimal and
welfare-optimal pricing schemes. We identify that the data cap provides a mechanism for ISPs to transition from the flat-rate
to pay-as-you-go type of usage-based schemes. Our results reveal that both of the revenue and welfare objectives move the
two-part pricing towards usage-based schemes with the diminishing data cap. From a perspective of regulation, our results
suggest that regulators might want to promote usage-based pricing but regulate the lump-sum and per-unit fees because the
welfare-optimal pricing comprises lower fees than the revenue-optimal counterpart.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: For a set N of providers and any user type φ ∈ Φi(θ,q, q0), by Definition 1, it satisfies that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θj , qj), v, θj),∀j 6= i. (12)
By Equations (1) and (2), the utility function pi is non-decreasing in g and non-increasing in f and p. Thus we have that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θˆi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi). (13)
Because y∗(φ, θˆi, qi) is the user’s optimal usage which maximizes her utility when the pricing strategy is θˆi, it satisfies that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θˆi, qi), v, θˆi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θˆi). (14)
By Inequalities (12), (13), and (14), we can derive that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θˆi, qi), v, θˆi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θj , qj), v, θj) = pi(y∗(φ, θˆj , qj), v, θˆj),∀j 6= i. (15)
By Definition 1, we know that φ ∈ Φi(θˆ,q, q0) and therefore Φi(θ,q, q0) ⊆ Φi(θˆ,q, q0). Similarly, we can know that
Φj(θˆ,q, q0) ⊆ Φj(θ,q, q0), ∀ j 6= i.
When there exist two sets N and N ′ of providers, for any provider i ∈ N ⊆ N ′ and any user type φ ∈ Φi(θ′,q′, q0), it
satisfies that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi
)
= pi
(
y∗(φ, θ′i, q
′
i), v, θ
′
i
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θ′j , q′j), v, θ′j) = pi(y∗(φ, θj , qj), v, θj),∀j ∈ N\{i}
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by Definition 1. Thus we have φ ∈ Φi(θ,q, q0) by Definition 1 and therefore Φi(θ′,q′, q0) ⊆ Φi(θ,q, q0),∀i ∈ N . 
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove the existence of equilibrium. By Definition 2, q is an equilibrium if and only if
qi = Qi
(
D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0); θi, qi
)
, ci
)
for ∀i ∈ N . Since θ, c and q0 are constants, we omit them in the notation and write
the above in a matrix form as q = Q
(
D(q)
)
= Q ◦D(q). Thus, we can view the composite function Q ◦D as a mapping
from the convex set R|N |+ to itself. By Assumption 3, we know that each Qi(di, ci) is continuous in di and thus each
Qi
(
D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0); θi, qi
)
, ci
)
is continuous in q. To this end, we know that Q ◦ D(q) is continuous in q. By Brouwer
fixed-point theorem, there always exists a fixed point that satisfies Q ◦D(q) = q and thus is an equilibrium.
Next, we prove the first property by contradiction. Suppose there exist equilibria q and qˆ that makes (qi− qˆi)(qj − qˆj) < 0.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that qi < qˆi and qj > qˆj . For any user type φ ∈ Φi(θ, qˆ, q0), by Definition 1, it
satisfies that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qˆi), v, θi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θj , qˆj), v, θj). (16)
By Assumption 1, we have ρ(u, qi) > ρ(u, qˆi) and ρ(u, qj) < ρ(u, qˆj). By the optimization problem in (3), we know that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θi, qˆi), v, θi) and pi(y∗(φ, θj , qj), v, θj) ≤ pi(y∗(φ, θj , qˆj), v, θj). (17)
By Inequalities (16) and (17), we can derive that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θj , qj), v, θj).
Thus we know that φ ∈ Φi(θ,q, q0) by Definition 1 and therefore Φi(θ, qˆ, q0) ⊆ Φi(θ,q, q0). By Equation (4), the optimal
usage y∗(φ, θ, q) is non-increasing in q and thus it satisfies that
y∗(φ, θi, qi) ≥ y∗(φ, θi, qˆi). (18)
By Inequality (18), it satisfies that
D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0);θ,q
)
=
∫
Φi(θ,q,q0)
y∗i (φ, θi, qi)dµ ≥
∫
Φi(θ,qˆ,q0)
y∗i (φ, θi, qˆi)dµ = D
(
Φi(θ, qˆ, q0);θ, qˆ
)
.
By Assumption 3, we have
qi = Q
(
D
(
Φi(θ,q, q0);θ,q
)
, ci
)
≥ Q
(
D
(
Φi(θ, qˆ, q0);θ, qˆ
)
, ci
)
= qˆi
which is contradictory with the supposition of qi < qˆi.
Finally, we prove the second property by contradiction. Suppose there exist two equilibria qI and qˆI under fixed pricing
strategy θI , capacity cI and congestion q0. Without loss of generality, we assume that qI < qˆI . For any user type φ ∈
ΦI(θI , qˆI , q0), by Definition 1, it satisfies that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qˆI), v, θI
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θ0, q0), v, θ0) (19)
where θ0 = (g0, 0, 0) is the pricing strategy of the free provider. By Assumption 1, we have ρ(u, qI) > ρ(u, qˆI). By the
optimization problem in (3), we know that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qI), v, θI
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θI , qˆI), v, θI). (20)
By Inequalities (19) and (20), we can derive that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qI), v, θI
) ≥ pi(y∗(φ, θ0, q0), v, θ0).
Thus we know that φ ∈ ΦI(θI , qI , q0) by Definition 1 and therefore ΦI(θI , qˆI , q0) ⊆ ΦI(θI , qI , q0). By Equation (4), the
optimal usage y∗(φ, θ, q) is non-increasing in q and thus it satisfies that
y∗(φ, θI , qI) ≥ y∗(φ, θI , qˆI). (21)
Therefore, by Inequality (21), it satisfies that
D
(
ΦI(θI , qI , q0); θI , qI
)
=
∫
ΦI(θI ,qI ,q0)
y∗(φ, θI , qI)dµ ≥
∫
ΦI(θI ,qˆI ,q0)
y∗(φ, θI , qˆI)dµ = D
(
ΦI(θI , qˆI , q0); θI , qˆI
)
.
Furthermore, by Assumption 3, we have
qI = Q
(
D
(
ΦI(θI , qI , q0); θI , qI
)
, cI
)
≥ Q
(
D
(
ΦI(θI , qˆI , q0); θI , qˆI
)
, cI
)
= qˆI
which is contradictory with the supposition of qI < qˆI . 
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Proof of Theorem 2: We first prove the congestion in equilibrium is non-increasing in the lump-sum fee by contradiction.
Suppose the congestion in equilibrium is not non-increasing in the lump-sum fee, there must exist pricing strategies θI =
(gI , fI , pI) and θˆI = (gI , fˆI , pI) satisfying fI > fˆI and qI(θI , cI , q0) > qI(θˆI , cI , q0). By Inequality (15), we have that for
any user type φ ∈ ΦI
(
θI , qI(θI , cI , q0), q0
)
,
pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θˆI , qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θˆI
)
≥ pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θI , qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θI
)
. (22)
By Assumption 1, we have ρ
(
u, qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
< ρ
(
u, qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
)
. Thus, by the optimization problem in (3), we know that
pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θˆI
)
≥ pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θˆI , qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θˆI
)
. (23)
By Inequalities (22) and (23), it satisfies that
pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θˆI
)
≥ pi
(
y∗
(
φ, θI , qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
, v, θI
)
.
Thus we know that φ ∈ ΦI
(
θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0), q0
)
by Definition 1 and ΦI
(
θI , qI(θI , cI , q0), q0
) ⊆ ΦI(θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0), q0).
By Equation (4), the optimal usage y∗ is non-increasing in q and thus it satisfies that
y∗
(
φ, θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
) ≥ y∗(φ, θI , qI(θI , cI , q0)). (24)
By Inequality (24), we can derive that
D
(
ΦI
(
θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0), q0
)
; θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
)
=
∫
ΦI
(
θˆI ,qI(θˆI ,cI ,q0),q0
) y∗(φ, θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0))dµ
≥
∫
ΦI
(
θI ,qI(θI ,cI ,q0),q0
) y∗(φ, θI , qI(θI , cI , q0))dµ = D(ΦI(θI , qI(θI , cI , q0), q0); θI , qI(θI , cI , q0)).
Furthermore, by Assumption 3, we have
qI(θˆI , cI , q0) = Q
(
D
(
ΦI
(
θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0), q0
)
; θˆI , qI(θˆI , cI , q0)
)
, cI
)
≥ Q
(
D
(
ΦI
(
θI , qI(θI , cI , q0), q0
)
; θI , qI(θI , cI , q0)
)
, cI
)
= qI(θI , cI , q0)
which is contradictory with the supposition of qI(θI , cI , q0) > qI(θˆI , cI , q0). Therefore, the congestion qI(θI , cI , q0) in
equilibrium is non-increasing in the lump-sum fee fI .
Similarly, we can prove that qI(θI , cI , q0) is non-increasing in the per-unit fee pI and the capacity cI , but non-decreasing
in the data cap gI and the congestion level q0. In a similar way, we can also prove that when new providers enter the market,
the existing provider’s congestion level will not increase, i.e., qI(θ, c, q0) ≤ qI(θI , cI , q0). 
Proof of Corollary 1: We first prove that under qˆ = q, it satisfies dˆi = di/
(
Uµ(Φ)
)
for ∀i ∈ N . We denote the market
share and pricing strategy of the provider i in the normalized system by Φˆi and θˆi = (gˆi, fˆi, pˆi), respectively. For any user type
φ = (u, v) ∈ Φ, we denote the corresponding type in the normalized system by φˆ = (uˆ, vˆ) = (u/U, v/V ) ∈ Φˆ. By Equation
(4) and the condition of ρ(u, q) = ue−q , we know that
y∗(φˆ, θˆi, qˆi) = uˆe−qˆi − (uˆe−qˆi − gˆi)+1{vˆ<pˆi} =
ue−qi
U
−
(
ue−qi
U
− gi
U
)+
1{ vV < piV }
=
1
U
[
ue−qi − (ue−qi − gi)+ 1{v<pi}] = y∗(φ, θi, qi)U . (25)
By Equations (1), (2), and (25), it satisfeis that
pi
(
y∗(φˆ, θˆi, qˆi), vˆ, θˆi
)
= vˆy∗(φˆ, θˆi, qˆi)− fˆi − pˆi
[
y∗(φˆ, θˆi, qˆi)− gˆi
]+
=
v
V
y∗(φ, θi, qi)
U
− fi
UV
− pi
V
[
y∗(φ, θi, qi)
U
− gi
U
]+
=
pi
(
y∗(φ, θi, qi), v, θi
)
UV
(26)
implying that φˆ ∈ Φˆi(θˆ, qˆ, qˆ0) if and only if φ ∈ Φi(θ,q, q0) by Definition 1. Furthermore, by Equations (25) and (26), we
can deduce that
dˆi =
∫
Φˆi(θˆ,qˆ,qˆ0)
y∗(φˆ, θˆi, qˆi)dµˆ =
∫
Φi(θ,q,q0)
y∗(φ, θi, qi)
U
d
(
µ
µ(Φ)
)
=
di
Uµ(Φ)
. (27)
Next, we show that qˆ = q is an equilibrium in the normalized system. By Equation (27) and the condition of Qi(d, c) = d/c,
we have that
qˆi = qi = Qi(di, ci) = Qi
(
Uµ(Φ)dˆi, Uµ(Φ)cˆi
)
= Qi(dˆi, cˆi)
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implying that qˆ = q is an equilibrium in the normalized system by Definition 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3: To understand the proof of this theorem, the notations and results in Section IV-B are needed.
We first prove that R∗I(gI) ≥ R∗∞ for ∀gI ≥ 0. We use lim
gˆI→+∞
f∗I (gˆI) to denote an optimal lump-sum fee under the flat-rate,
i.e., the data cap is infinite. We use RI(gI , fI , pI) to denote the ISP’s revenue under the pricing strategy θI = (gI , fI , pI). By
the optimization problem in (8), we have that for ∀gI ≥ 0,
R∗I(gI) ≥ RI
(
gI , lim
gˆI→+∞
f∗I (gˆI), 0
)
= lim
gˆI→+∞
RI
(
gˆI , f
∗
I (gˆI), 0
)
= R∗∞.
We then prove that R∗I(gI) ≤ R∗I(0) for ∀gI ≥ 0. To prove this result, we only need to show that any revenue-optimal
fixed pay-as-you-go pricing is also a revenue-optimal fixed two-part pricing, which in fact can be implied by Proposition 3
and 4. In particular, by Proposition 4, a revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing is also a revenue-optimal demand-based
pay-as-you-go pricing, which generates no lower revenue than any demand-based two-part pricing by Proposition 3. Because
the fixed two-part pricing structure is a specialization of the demand-based two-part pricing, any revenue-optimal fixed pay-
as-you-go pricing generates no lower revenue than any fixed two-part pricing. Thus, any revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go
pricing is also a revenue-optimal fixed two-part pricing and therefore R∗I(gI) ≤ R∗I(0) for ∀gI ≥ 0.
We finally prove that f∗I (0) = 0 by contradiction. Suppose there exists a pricing strategy θI = (0, fI , pI) (fI > 0) satisfying
that RI(0, fI , pI) = R∗I(0). We conduct a demand-based pricing strategy θ˜I(u) =
(
0, 0, fI/ρ
(
u, qI(θI)
)
+ pI
)
. by Definition
3, qI(θI) is an equilibrium under the strategy θ˜I(u). Furthermore, it satisfies that
RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
= RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI(θI)
)
= RI(θI , qI) = RI(0, fI , pI). (28)
However, because fI/ρ
(
u, qI(θI)
)
+ pI is not a constant function of u, by Proposition 4, θ˜I(u) must not be an revenue-
optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing and generates lower revenue than any revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing.
Therefore, we have that
RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
< R∗I(0). (29)
by Inequalities (28) and (29), we know that RI(0, fI , pI) < R∗I(0), which is contradictory with the supposition of RI(0, fI , pI) =
R∗I(0). Thus we know that f
∗
I (0) must be zero. 
Proof of Proposition 2: For any fixed parameters qI , q0, u and two-part pricing θI , we conduct the pay-as-you-go pricing
θ˜I = (0, 0, p˜I) satisfying RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = RI(θI , qI , u) and dI(θ˜I , qI , u) ≤ dI(θI , qI , u) under the following two cases.
The first case is when qI ≥ q0 or ρ(u, qI) ≤ gI or pIgI − fI ≤ pIρ(u, q0). Under this case, we set
p˜I =
fI +
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]+
pI
ρ(u, qI)
. (30)
Next, we show that the ISP has the same revenue and data load under the two pricing strategies θI and θ˜I .
If qI ≥ q0, all users would choose the free provider no matter the ISP adopts the pricing strategy θI or θ˜I . Thus we have
that RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = RI(θI , qI , u) = 0 and dI(θ˜I , qI , u) = dI(θI , qI , u) = 0.
If qI < q0 and ρ(u, qI) ≤ gI , by Equation (4), it satisfies that
y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI) = y∗(φ, θI , qI) = ρ(u, qI) ≤ gI (31)
for any user type φ = (u, v),∀v ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, by Equations (2) and (30), we have that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI), v, θ˜I
)
= pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qI), v, θI
)
= vρ(u, qI)− fI .
By Definition 1, we know that VI(θ˜I , qI , u) = VI(θI , qI , u) and thus we have
RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θ˜I ,qI ,u)
fIdFv = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
fIdµ = RI(θI , qI , u)
by Equation (9), and
dI(θ˜I , qI , u) = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θ˜I ,qI ,u)
ρ(u, qI)dFv = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
ρ(u, qI)dFv = dI(θI , qI , u)
by Equations (10) and (31).
If qI < q0 and ρ(u, qI) > gI and pIgI − fI ≤ pIρ(u, q0), for any user type φ = (u, v),∀v < pI , it satisfies that
y∗(φ, θI , qI) = gI and y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI) = ρ(u, qI) by Equation (4). Thus we have that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qI), v, θI
)
= vgI − fI ≤ pIgI − fI ≤ vρ(u, q0) and
pi
(
y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI), v, θ˜I
)
= vρ(u, qI)− fI −
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
pI ≤ vρ(u, qI)− pIρ(u, qI) + pIρ(u, q0) ≤ vρ(u, q0)
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by Equation (2). It implies that the user type φ = (u, v),∀v < pI would not choose the ISP no matter it adopts the pricing
strategy θI or θ˜I . Thus, we know that VI(θ˜I , qI , u), VI(θI , qI , u) ⊆ [pI , V ]. Furthermore, for any user type φ = (u, v),∀v ≥ pI ,
it satisfies that
y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI) = y∗(φ, θI , qI) = ρ(u, qI) ≥ gI
by Equation (4). Therefore, by Equations (2) and (30), for any user type φ = (u, v),∀v ≥ pI , we have that
pi
(
y∗(φ, θ˜I , qI), v, θ˜I
)
= pi
(
y∗(φ, θI , qI), v, θI
)
= vρ(u, qI)− fI −
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
pI
implying that VI(θ˜I , qI , u) = VI(θI , qI , u). Then by Equations (9) and (10), we know that
RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θ˜I ,qI ,u)
fI +
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
pIdFv = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
fI +
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
pIdFv = RI(θI , qI , u)
dI(θ˜I , qI , u) = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θ˜I ,qI ,u)
ρ(u, qI)dFv = F
′
u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
ρ(u, qI)dFv = dI(θI , qI , u).
The second case is when qI < q0 and ρ(u, qI) > gI and pIgI − fI > pIρ(u, q0). Under this case, by Definition 1 and
Equation (9), when the ISP adopts the pricing strategy θI , the set of the values of the users who choose the ISP and the
revenue of the ISP are
VI(θI , qI , u) =
{
v ∈ [0, 1] : v ≥ fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
}
and RI(θI , qI , u) = F ′u(u)
∫
VI(θI ,qI ,u)
t
(
y∗((u, v), θI , qI), θI
)
dFv (32)
respectively. When the ISP adopts the pricing strategy θ˜I , the set of the values of the users who choose the ISP and the revenue
of the ISP are
VI(θ˜I , qI , u) =
{
v ∈ [0, 1] : v ≥ ρ(u, qI)p˜I
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
}
and RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = F ′u(u)
∫
VI(θ˜I ,qI ,u)
p˜Iρ(u, qI)dFv. (33)
We set p˜I as the solution of the equlations:
(
1
β + 1
) 1
β 1
M
≤ p˜I ≤ 1
M
RI(θ˜I , qI , u) = RI(θI , qI , u)
where M , ρ(u, qI)
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0) . (34)
Next, we first show that Equations (34) has a unique solution. Based on Assumption 4, the distribution function of user
valuation is Fv(v) = vβ . We define a continuous function y(x) ,
∫ 1
x
xdFv(v) = x(1 − xβ),∀x ∈ [0, 1]. It is increasing and
concave in x ∈ [0, ( 1β+1 )
1
β ], decreasing in x ∈ [( 1β+1 )
1
β , 1] and satisfies that 0 = y(1) ≤ y(x) ≤ y(( 1β+1 ) 1β ) for ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
By Equation (33), we have that
RI(θ˜I , qI , u) =
∫ 1
Mp˜I
ρ(u, qI)p˜IdFvF
′
u(u) =
[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
y(Mp˜I)F
′
u(u) (35)
implying that RI(θ˜I , qI , u) is decreasing in p˜I ∈
[(
1
β+1
) 1
β 1
M ,
1
M
]
. By Equation (32), we have that
RI(θI , qI , u) =
{∫ pI
fI
gI−ρ(u,q0)
fIdFv +
∫ 1
pI
fI +
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
pIdFv
}
F ′u(u)
=
{[
gI − ρ(u, q0)
] ∫ 1
fI
gI−ρ(u,q0)
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)dFv +
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
] ∫ 1
pI
pIdFv
}
F ′u(u)
=
{[
gI − ρ(u, q0)
]
y
(
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)
+
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
y(pI)
}
F ′u(u) (36)
≤ [ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)]y(( 1
β + 1
)
1
β
)
F ′u(u)
from which it satisfies
RI
((
0, 0, (
1
β + 1
)
1
β
1
M
)
, qI , u
)
=
[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
y
(
(
1
β + 1
)
1
β
)
F ′u(u) ≥ RI(θI , qI , u) ≥ 0 = RI
((
0, 0,
1
M
)
, qI , u
)
implying that Equations (34) must have a unique solution.
We then show that dI(θI , qI , u) ≥ dI(θ˜I , qI , u) under two situations: (i) pI ≤Mp˜I and (ii) pI > Mp˜I .
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For the situation (i), it satisfies that fI/
[
gI − ρ(u, q0)
]
< pI ≤Mp˜I . By Equation (10), we can deduce that
dI(θ˜I , qI , u) =
∫ 1
Mp˜I
ρ(u, qI)dFvF
′
u(u) ≤
∫ 1
pI
ρ(u, qI)dFvF
′
u(u) +
∫ pI
fI
gI−ρ(u,q0)
gIdFvF
′
u(u) = dI(θI , qI , u).
For the situation (ii), we first define continuous functions z(x) =
∫ 1
x
dFv(v) = 1− xβ and w(x) = x(1− x) 1β ,∀x ∈ [0, 1]
and it satisfies that
w
(
z(x)
)
= z(x)
(
1− z(x)) 1β = x(1− xβ) = y(x). (37)
By Equations (34), (35), (36) and (37), we have that[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
w
(
z(Mp˜I)
)
=
[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
w
(
z(pI)
)
+
[
gI − ρ(u, q0)
]
w
(
z
( fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
))
. (38)
If
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0) ≥ (
1
β + 1
)
1
β , we have 0 ≤ z(pI) ≤ z(Mp˜I) ≤ z
( fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)
≤ z
(
(
1
β + 1
)
1
β
)
=
β
β + 1
. Because
w(z) is increasing and concave in z ∈ [0, ββ+1 ], by Equation (38) and Jensen’s inequality, we can deduce that[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
z
(
Mp˜I
) ≤ [ρ(u, qI)− gI]z(pI) + [gI − ρ(u, q0)]z( fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)
.
If
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0) < (
1
β + 1
)
1
β , there must exist a value kI ∈
[
( 1β+1 )
1
β , 1
]
which satisfies that w
(
z(kI)
)
= w
(
z
(
fI
gI−ρ(u,q0)
))
,
because w
(
z(x)
)
is continiously decreasing in x ∈ [( 1β+1 ) 1β , 1] and satisfies that w(z(( 1β+1 ) 1β )) ≥ w(z( fIgI−ρ(u,q0) )) ≥
w
(
z(1)
)
. Then we have 0 ≤ z(pI) ≤ z(Mp˜I) ≤ z(kI) ≤ ββ+1 and z(kI) ≤ z( fIgI−ρ(u,q0) ). Because w(z) is increasing and
concave in z ∈ [0, ββ+1 ], by Equation (38) and Jensen’s inequality, we can deduce that[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
z
(
Mp˜I
) ≤ [ρ(u, qI)− gI]z(pI) + [gI − ρ(u, q0)]z(kI)
≤ [ρ(u, qI)− gI]z(pI) + [gI − ρ(u, q0)]z( fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)
.
Therefore, combining with Equation (10), we have that
dI(θ˜I , qI , u) =
∫ 1
Mp˜I
ρ(u, qI)dFvF
′
u(u) = ρ(u, qI)z
(
Mp˜I
)
F ′u(u) =
{[
ρ(u, qI)− ρ(u, q0)
]
z
(
Mp˜I
)
+ ρ(u, q0)z
(
Mp˜I
)}
F ′u(u)
≤
{[
ρ(u, qI)− gI
]
z(pI) +
[
gI − ρ(u, q0)
]
z
(
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)
+ ρ(u, q0)z
(
fI
gI − ρ(u, q0)
)}
F ′u(u)
=
{∫ pI
fI
gI−ρ(u,q0)
gIdFv +
∫ 1
pI
ρ(u, qI)dFv
}
F ′u(u) = dI(θI , qI , u). 
Proof of Lemma 1: This lemma can be proofed by the similar way with Theorem 1. In particular, for any demand-based
pricing θI(u), we can show the existence of the equilibrium based on the Brouwer fixed-point theorem and the uniqueness of
the equilibrium by contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3: By Proposition 2, for any u0 ∈ [0, 1] and the fixed two-part pricing θu0I , θI(u0), there always
exists a fixed pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜u0I satisfying thatRI
(
θ˜u0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
= RI
(
θu0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
dI
(
θ˜u0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
≤ dI
(
θu0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
.
(39)
We conduct a demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜I(u) which satisfies θ˜I(u0) = θ˜u0I for any u0 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus we have that
RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θI(u)
))
=
∫ 1
0
RI
(
θ˜u0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
du0 =
∫ 1
0
RI
(
θu0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
du = RI
(
θI(u), qI
(
θI(u)
))
, (40)
dI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θI(u)
))
=
∫ 1
0
dI
(
θ˜u0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
du0 ≤
∫ 1
0
dI
(
θu0I , qI
(
θI(u)
)
, u0
)
du = dI
(
θI(u), qI
(
θI(u)
))
. (41)
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Next, we show that qI
(
θ˜I(u)
) ≤ qI(θI(u)) by contradiction. Suppose that qI(θ˜I(u)) > qI(θI(u)). By Equations (3) and (4),
any user’s optimal utility and usage are both non-increasing in the congestion level, and thus the ISP’s data load under the con-
gestion qI
(
θI(u)
)
is no smaller than that under the congestion qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)
, i.e., dI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)) ≤ dI(θ˜I(u), qI(θI(u))).
Furthermore, Combining with Inequality (41), we have that
dI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)) ≤ dI(θ˜I(u), qI(θI(u))) ≤ dI(θI(u), qI(θI(u))).
By Assumption 3, we can deduce that
qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)
= QI
(
dI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
, cI
)
≤ QI
(
dI
(
θI(u), qI
(
θI(u)
))
, cI
)
= qI
(
θI(u)
)
which is contradictory with the supposition. Thus it satisfies that qI
(
θ˜I(u)
) ≤ qI(θI(u)).
Finally, because any user’s optimal utility and usage are both non-increasing in the congestion level, the ISP’s revenue is
also non-increasing in the congestion level, combining with Inequality (40), we have that
RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)) ≥ RI(θ˜I(u), qI(θI(u))) = RI(θI(u), qI(θI(u))). 
Proof of Proposition 4: It is obvious that if θ˜I(u) ,
(
0, 0, p˜I(u)
)
where p˜I(u) = p˜I for all u ∈ [0, 1] is a revenue-optimal
demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing, θ˜I ,
(
0, 0, p˜I
)
must be a revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing. Thus we focus
on proving that if θ˜I ,
(
0, 0, p˜I
)
is a revenue-optimal fixed pay-as-you-go pricing, θ˜I(u) ,
(
0, 0, p˜I(u)
)
where p˜I(u) = p˜I
for all u ∈ [0, 1] must be a revenue-optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing. To prove this, we only need to show that
any revenue-optimal demand-based pay-as-you-go pricing θ˜I(u) must satisfy that p˜I(u) is a constant function of u ∈ [0, 1].
Under Assumption 4, we have Fv(x) = xβ . We denote that h(u) ,
(
p˜I(u)
)β
,∀u ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the equilibrium congestion
and revenue of the ISP under the pricing strategy θ˜I(u) are functions of h(u). We denote
s
(
h(u)
)
, qI
(
θ˜I(u)
)
and T
(
h(u)
)
, RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
.
Because θ˜I(u) is a revenue-optimal pricing strategy, h(u) is an optimal solution of the problem:
Maximize T
(
x(u)
)
subject to x(u) ≥ 0 for ∀u ∈ [0, 1].
We define a function H() , T
(
h(u) + η(u)
)
where η(u) is a disturbing function. Because T
(
h(u)
) ≥ T (h(u) + η(u)),
we have the first order condition
dH()
d
∣∣
=0
= 0 (42)
By Equation (10) and (11), the ISP’s data load under the pricing strategy θ˜I(u) is
dI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
K
(
qI(θ˜I(u))
)
p˜I(u0)
ρ
(
u0, qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
dFv(v)dFu(u0)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
K
(
s(h(u))
)(
h(u0)
) 1
β
u0e
−s(h(u))dFv(v)dFu(u0) =
∫ 1
0
{
1−
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β
h(u0)
}
u0dFu(u0) · e−s(h(u)).
where K(x) , e−x/(e−x − e−q0). By Assumption 4, we have dI = cIqI and thus it satisfies that∫ 1
0
{
1−
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β
h(u0)
}
u0dFu(u0) · e−s(h(u)) = cIs
(
h(u)
)
. (43)
We define a function G(x) = [
∫ 1
0
u0dFu(u0)− cIxex]/[K(x)]β ,∀x ∈ [0, q0) and G(x) is decreasing in x. By Equation (43),
it satisfies that
G
(
s
(
h(u)
))
=
∫ 1
0
u0dFu(u0)− cIs
(
h(u)
)
es
(
h(u)
)
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β = ∫ 1
0
h(u0)u0dFu(u0)
from which we have that
s
(
h(u)
)
= G−1
(∫ 1
0
h(u0)u0dFu(u0)
)
.
Furthermore, for any disturbing function η(u) satisfying
∫ 1
0
η(u0)u0dFu(u0) = 0, we have that
ds
(
h(u) + η(u)
)
d
∣∣∣
=0
= (G−1)′
(∫ 1
0
h(u0)u0dFu(u0)
)
·
∫ 1
0
η(u0)u0dFu(u0) = 0 (44)
19
By Equations (9) and (11), the ISP’s revenue under the pricing strategy θ˜I(u) is
T
(
h(u)
)
= RI
(
θ˜I(u), qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
K
(
qI(θ˜I(u))
)
p˜I(u0)
p˜I(u0)ρ
(
u0, qI
(
θ˜I(u)
))
dFv(v)dFu(u0)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
K
(
s(h(u))
)(
h(u0)
) 1
β
[
h(u0)
] 1
β u0e
−s(h(u))dFv(v)dFu(u0)
=
∫ 1
0
{
1−
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β
h(u0)
}[
h(u0)
] 1
β u0dFu(u0) · e−s(h(u)).
(45)
We define a function W (x) , x 1β−1
{
1− (β + 1)x
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β}
. By Equations (42), (44), and (45), we can deduce that
dH()
d
∣∣∣
=0
=
dT
(
h(u) + η(u)
)
d
∣∣∣
=0
=
∫ 1
0
{
1−
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β
h(u0)
}
1
β
[
h(u0)
] 1
β−1η(u0)u0dFu(u0) · e−s(h(u))
−
∫ 1
0
[
K
(
s(h(u))
)]β
η(u0)
[
h(u0)
] 1
β u0dFu(u0) · e−s(h(u)) = 1
β
∫ 1
0
η(u0)u0W
(
h(u0)
)
dFu(u0) · e−s
(
h(u)
)
= 0.
Thus, we have
∫ 1
0
η(u0)u0W
(
h(u0)
)
dFu(u0) = 0 if
∫ 1
0
η(u0)u0dFu(u0) = 0.
We make a substitution ξ(u0) = u0F ′u(u0)η(u0). Then for any function ξ(u) satisfying
∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)du0 = 0, we have∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)W
(
h(u0)
)
du0 = 0. Based on this condition, we next prove that W
(
h(u)
)
is a constant function of u ∈ [0, 1]
by contradiction. Suppose W
(
h(u)
)
is not a constant function. Then there must exist  > 0 and u1, u2 ∈ (0, 1) satisfying that∣∣W (h(u1))−W (h(u2))∣∣ > . Because we assumed that p˜I(u) is a continuous function on [0, 1], W (h(u)) is also continuous
on [0, 1]. Furthermore, it must be uniformly continuous on [0, 1]. By the uniform continuity, there must exist δ satisfying∣∣W (h(uˆ))−W (h(u))∣∣ < 3 , ∀|uˆ− u| < δ. We conduct the function ξ(u) as follows:
ξ(u) =

1 if |u− u1| < δ,
−1 if |u− u2| < δ,
0 otherwise.
It is obvious that
∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)du0 = 0. However,∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)W
(
h(u0)
)
du0
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ ∫ u1+δ
u1−δ
W
(
h(u0)
)
du0 −
∫ u2+δ
u2−δ
W
(
h(u0)
)
du0
∣∣∣
≥
(∣∣∣(W (h(u1))−W (h(u2))∣∣∣− 2
3
)
· 2δ ≥ 2δ
3
> 0.
This is contradictory with
∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)W
(
h(u0)
)
du0 = 0 under the condition
∫ 1
0
ξ(u0)du0 = 0. Thus, W
(
h(u)
)
is a constant
function of u. Furthermore, h(u) is a constant function of u and thus p˜I(u) is also a constant function of u. Therefore,
Proposition 3 is proved. 
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